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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 12, 2008, the United States Supreme Court handed
down the ruling in Boumediene v. Bush,' a decision considered to
be one of the most important rulings on separation of powers ever
issued.2 In that landmark case, the Supreme Court held that in-
dividuals detained at Guantanamo Bay had the constitutional pri-
1. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
2. Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5-4, Back Detainee Appeals for Guantanamo, N.Y.
TIMES, June 13, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/13/washington/13scotus.html.
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vilege of habeas corpus.3 Though Boumediene established this
overarching rule, the Supreme Court did not define the scope or
parameters of the habeas privilege, instead leaving many ques-
tions to be answered by the district courts which had jurisdiction
over these cases.'
Because Boumediene left several issues for the lower courts to
decide, there was concern that those courts would have broad
power to shape the law for all Guantanamo detainee cases in a
manner that would expand the power of the Judiciary at the ex-
pense of the Executive Branch. As Justice Scalia remarked in his
Boumediene dissent, the Court's decision was "an inflated notion
of judicial supremacy [that the] ... Nation will live to regret[.]"J
While Boumediene garnered significant attention as a landmark
decision, the Supreme Court unanimously decided another case on
June 12, 2008, which had nothing to do with Guantanamo Bay,
but would soon become the focal point of a separation of powers
issue brewing over those cases.7 The Court in Munaf v. Geren con-
cluded that American citizens being held by the Multinational
Force-Iraq ("MNF-I") could petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
the United States federal courts, but those courts were powerless
to prevent the transfer of the petitioners to the Iraqi Government
for the purposes of criminal prosecution.9 In making this determi-
nation, the Supreme Court noted that the Judiciary was not in a
position to "second-guess" the Executive's policy determinations,
as it is within the realm of the Executive Branch to handle issues
regarding foreign relations."0
3. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771.
4. Id. at 798. The United States Supreme Court previously held that United States
district courts had jurisdiction to hear claims of unlawful detention posed by Guantanamo
detainees. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004). The Boumediene Court also suggested
that consolidating these cases into one circuit would be beneficial for the Government, and
suggested that the Government could file a motion for change of venue to the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia if a case were originally filed in a different Cir-
cuit. 553 U.S. at 795-96 (citations omitted).
5. Id. at 842 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
6. Id. at 850.
7. Munafv. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008).
8. "The Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) is an international coalition force operating
in Iraq composed of 26 different nations, including the United States. The force operates
under the unified command of United States military officers, at the request of the Iraqi
Government... MNF-I forces detain individuals alleged to have committed hostile or war-
like acts in Iraq, pending investigation and prosecution in Iraqi courts under Iraqi law."
Munaf, 553 U.S. at 679.
9. Munaf 553 U.S. 674, 680.
10. Id. at 702.
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Following these decisions, the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia and the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals (hereinafter "D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals")
handled over 200 habeas petitions filed on behalf of Guantanamo
detainees." As of 2011, a general trend in the outcomes of these
habeas cases was obvious: detainees had prevailed in a majority of
their cases in the district court, but their actual release from con-
finement had been stifled by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals'
deference to the policies of the Executive Branch.
2
Though there have been various issues in the Guantanamo cas-
es, two of the most contested issues concern the ability of the
courts to effectuate the release of detainees once they have pre-
vailed on habeas petitions and the validity of court orders requir-
ing the government to provide advance notice to detainees and
their counsel prior to transfer from Guantanamo. The trend in
the District of Columbia Circuit is evident in a line of cases re-
garding these issues. The district court in that circuit has as-
sumed the power to effectuate release or require notice, only to be
reversed at the appellate level based on the latter's interpretation
of the Supreme Court's Boumediene and Munaf decisions.13
Though there have been several petitions for certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court requesting guidance and clarifica-
tion of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals' jurisprudence on these
issues, the merits have never been reached.1
4
This Comment will begin by examining the history of habeas pe-
titions in Guantanamo cases, including the status of the law after
September 11, 2001 and the Supreme Court's decisions in Boume-
diene and Munaf in 2008. It will then focus on a line of three cas-
es in the D.C. Circuit which have raised separation of powers is-
sues of the power of the court to release petitioners and the power
of the court to order notice or enjoin transfers from Guantanamo.
These cases, all named Kiyemba v. Obama, but distinguished as
11. Greenhouse, supra note 2.
12. Lyle Denniston, Boumediene: The Record So Far, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 2, 2011, 11:44
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/0/looumediene.
13. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Munaf, 553 U.S. 674.
14. Lyle Denniston, Down to the Last on Detainees, SCOTUSBLOG (May. 23, 2011, 10:55
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/05/down-to-the-last-on-detainees. At the end of the
2010 Supreme Court Term, all eight petitions for certiorari on various Guantanamo detai-
nee issues failed to be addressed on the merits. Id. Additional petitions for certiorari per-
taining to detainees' rights and the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of the law on these matters
continue to be filed. Id.
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Kiyemba I,15 Kiyemba H,16 and Kiyemba III, have shaped the D.C.
Circuit's policy of deference to the Executive. Following the dis-
cussion of these cases, this Comment will review three petitions
for certiorari filed in the 2010 Term concerning the issues of re-
lease and transfer, none of which reached the Court on the merits.
Lastly, this Comment will discuss the petitioners' arguments for
judicial authority under habeas jurisdiction and the Government's
arguments for deference in foreign policy matters, and suggest
that the Supreme Court should make the ultimate decision on
where the power lies. Because these cases have been litigated in
the D.C. Circuit, the opportunity for a circuit split does not
present itself and the Circuit Court's decisions are controlling.
The divergence between the rulings of the district court and the
court of appeals within the D.C. Circuit as well as the balance be-
tween the Executive's role in foreign policy and the Judiciary's
habeas powers are important issues that should be clarified by the
nation's highest court.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Leading Up to the Landmark-A Brief Overview of the Road
to Boumediene
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 ("9/11")
and American military involvement in the Middle East, the Unit-
ed States government had to determine how to handle suspected
terrorists who were captured by U.S. forces. After 9/11, Congress
enacted the Authorization of Use of Military Force ("AUMF")
which gave the President of the United States the authority to use
"necessary and appropriate force" against people, groups or organ-
izations involved in the terrorist attacks on American soil in order
to prevent future acts of terrorism.8 Under this authority, many
individuals were captured and taken to the United States Naval
Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.' In 2004, the Supreme Court
15. Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba 1), 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009) vacated, 130 S. Ct.
1235 (2010) (per curiam), reinstated as amended, Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba III), 605
F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1631 (2011).
16. Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba I/), 561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied 130 S.
Ct. 1880 (2010).
17. Kiyemba III, 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
1631 (2011).
18. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 733 (citing S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted)).




concluded that detention of such individuals for the duration of
the conflict constituted power that was "necessary and appropri-
ate" under AUMF.2°
Following that decision, Combatant Status Review Tribunals
("CSRTs") were implemented in order to determine if the persons
detained at Guantanamo were "enemy combatants," which is the
standard used to decide whether that individual could be de-
tained.2' The procedures implemented in the CSRTs were in-
tended to comply with necessary due process requirements.22
In 2002, the first petitions for habeas corpus were filed by de-
tainees, but were initially dismissed for lack of jurisdiction until
the Supreme Court confirmed that the district courts had jurisdic-
tion.23 After this determination, the D.C. Circuit consolidated the
cases into two proceedings.24 The judge presiding over the first set
of cases held that there were no rights which could be remedied in
a habeas action, and dismissed the cases.25 The petitioners in the
second set of cases were informed that they did have rights under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 2' The defeated
parties in both sets of cases appealed.27
Meanwhile, as this litigation was occurring, Congress passed
the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, known as the DTA.2' This
statute effectively eliminated the jurisdiction of the courts to hear
habeas petitions of Guantanamo prisoners, but granted to the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals exclusive jurisdiction to review the
determinations made by the CSRTs. 29 The Supreme Court then
ruled in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 30 that the DTA did not apply to any
baynavalbasecuba/index.htmil,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/13/washington/13scotus.html.
20. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
21. In re Guantanamo Detainee Litigation, 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 36 (D.D.C. 2008), rev'd
sub nom. Kiyemba 1, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009) vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (per
curiam), reinstated as amended, Kiyemba III, 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1631 (2011). An "enemy combatant" has been defined as "an indi-
vidual who was part of or supporting the Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces
that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners." Guan-
tanamo Bay, 581 F. Supp. 2d at 36.
22. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 734.
23. Id. (citations omitted).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 734-35 (citations omitted).
27. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 735.
28. Id. (citing Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 28, and 42 U.S.C.)).
29. Id. (citation omitted).
30. 548 U.S. 557, 576-77 (2006).
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petitioners who had cases pending when the statute was enacted. 1
The Military Commissions Act of 2006 ("MCA")32 was the response
of Congress secondary to that decision. 3  Section 7 of the MCA
caused jurisdiction to be stripped from all cases relating to deten-
tion, transfer or other circumstances pertaining to Guantanamo.34
This litigation set the stage for the Supreme Court's landmark
decision in Boumediene v. Bush.
B. June 12, 2008-An Important Day for Detainee Litigation
In Boumediene, several detainees, all of whom were foreign na-
tionals who denied connections to al Qaeda or the Taliban, peti-
tioned to the District Court for the District of Columbia for a writ
of habeas corpus to challenge their detention. 35 After the Hamdan
ruling which held that the DTA did not apply to cases which were
pending at the time of enactment, the Boumediene Petitioners'
cases were consolidated for appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.36 The Circuit Court held that § 7 of the MCA removed ju-
risdiction from all federal courts to hear habeas petitions, that
there was no privilege of habeas corpus or the Suspension
Clause,37 and that it was not necessary to determine whether the
DTA review procedures were an adequate substitute for habeas
corpus.
38
After granting the Petitioners' writ of certiorari, the Supreme
Court concluded that the MCA did take away the power of federal
courts to hear habeas petitions,39 but that the privilege of the Sus-
pension Clause was effective at Guantanamo Bay, and any denials
of habeas corpus were required to be in accordance with that
Clause. ° The Court noted that the privilege of habeas corpus pro-
vided the prisoner to "a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate
that he is being held pursuant to the erroneous application or in-
31. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 576-77.
32. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat 2600 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, and 28 U.S.C.).
33. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 735.
34. Id. (citations omitted).
35. Id. at 734.
36. Id. at 735.
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. The Suspension Clause provides that "[t]he privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public Safety may require it." Id.
38. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 735-36.
39. Id. at 739.
40. Id. at 771.
Vol. 50178
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terpretation' of relevant law."41 Importantly, the Court remarked
that the court hearing the habeas petitions must "have the power
to order the conditional release of an individual unlawfully de-
tained-though release need not be the exclusive remedy[." 2
When considering the history of the Great Writ, and examining
the review processes in effect under the DTA, the Supreme Court
held that the procedures outlined in the statute were an insuffi-
cient substitute for habeas corpus. 3 Thus, the Court found § 7 of
the MCA to be an unconstitutional suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus for Guantanamo detainees.44
Though the Boumediene decision, which expressly granted de-
tainees the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus, was he-
ralded as a landmark case in Guantanamo litigation, the Supreme
Court's decision in Munaf v. Geren on the same day would even-
tually play an important role in the separation of powers game
which has encompassed the Guantanamo cases.
In Munaf, two American citizens, Omar 5 and Munaf,46 volunta-
rily travelled to Iraq and were captured and detained under the
MNF-I as security threats to the country.47 Munaf was tried by
the Criminal Court of Iraq, but the case was vacated and re-
manded for further investigation on appeal." Omar's case was re-
41. Id. at 779 (citation omitted).
42. Id.
43. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 792. The Court determined that factors that were detri-
mental to the DTA review process included the inability of the court of appeals to look to
evidence outside of the CSRT record, which would prevent the court of appeals from looking
at new evidence that was unavailable at the time of the initial hearing. Id. at 789-90. The
Court also found the lack of language in the DTA statute permitting the remedy of release
to be "troubling," but was willing to consider that release could be implied by the language
of the statute. Id. at 787-88.
44. Id. at 792.
45. Shawqi Omar was a dual citizen of American and Jordan. Munaf v. Geren, 553
U.S. 674, 681 (2008). In 2004, he was captured by MNF-I forces after a raid at his home.
Munaf, 553 U.S. at 681. This raid produced explosives, weapons, one Iraqi insurgent and
four Jordanian fighters who provided sworn statements which implicated Omar in insur-
gent activities. Id. An MNF-I panel found that he was a threat to security, had committed
warlike acts and was an enemy combatant. Id. In a subsequent hearing before the Com-
bined Review and Release Board, the detention was affirmed. Id. at 682.
46. Munaf was serving as a translator for Romanian journalists in Iraq when the group
was kidnapped. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 683. Upon suspicion that Munaf had orchestrated the
kidnappings, he was detained after an MNF-I hearing and the case was transferred to the
Criminal Court of Iraq, which found him guilty of kidnapping. Id. at 683-84. The decision
was vacated and remanded for additional investigation. Id. at 684.
47. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 681, 683.
48. Id. at 684 (citation omitted).
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ferred to the Criminal Court of Iraq for criminal prosecution.49
Next-friend habeas petitions were filed in District Court for the
District of Columbia by relatives of both men.5 ° On certiorari, the
men questioned whether the United States courts had jurisdiction
over their petitions and, if so, whether the court could enjoin the
multinational force from releasing them into Iraqi custody for
prosecution.51
The Supreme Court consolidated the cases and granted certi-
orari after conflicting decisions in the lower courts.52 The Supreme
Court first held that the petitioners, even though detained over-
seas, had the privilege of habeas corpus.53 The writ of habeas,
however, was unable to afford Petitioners the remedy they sought.
Because the Iraqi Government was a sovereign body which had
the right to prosecute individuals for crimes committed within its
borders, the writ of habeas corpus could not be used to compel the
United States government to harbor alleged criminals.54
Although Munaf argued that his transfer would likely lead to
torture, the Court determined that this was a decision that was to
be addressed by the Executive, and not the Judiciary.55 In lan-
guage that would prove crucial in later Guantanamo cases, the
Supreme Court cited to the fundamental principles of separation
of powers and noted that "[t]he Judiciary is not suited to second-
guess such determinations--determinations that would require
federal courts to pass judgment on foreign justice systems and un-
dermine the Government's ability to speak with one voice in this
area.'56 According to the Court, the determination of whether a
person would likely face torture, and any remedies in the face of
49. Id. at 682. Counsel for Omar filed the habeas petition prior to the recommendation.
Id. Once this was revealed, counsel obtained a preliminary injunction which barred Omar's
removal from the custody of the United States or MNF-I, which was affirmed on appeal.
Id. The court of appeals, however, held that the injunction could not be used to enjoin
release. Id. at 682-83. It could only prevent the Government from transferring Omar to
Iraqi custody, sharing information about release with the Iraqi Government, and present-
ing Omar to the Criminal Court of Iraq for prosecution. Id. at 683.
50. Id. at 682, 684. The district court dismissed Munafs habeas petition for lack of
jurisdiction. Id. at 684. The court of appeals affirmed, and distinguished Munafs case
from Omar's by declaring that Munaf had been convicted in an Iraqi proceeding while
Omar had not. Id.
51. Id. at 680.
52. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 685.
53. Id. at 688 (citations omitted).
54. Id. at 697.
55. Id. at 700.
56. Id. at 702 (citation omitted).
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this likelihood, were well within the province of the political
branches.57
C. D.C. Circuit Defines the Scope of Boumediene-The Parame-
ters of Habeas Jurisdiction and the Court of Appeals' Defe-
rence to the Executive
After the Boumediene and Munaf cases, it was clear that the
United States district courts have habeas jurisdiction over detai-
nee cases, and the District of Columbia Circuit has taken center
stage in Guantanamo cases." While many felt that Boumediene
granted federal judges considerable control over the legal fate of
detainees, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals used the Supreme
Court's warning not to "second-guess" the Executive as its mantra
in detainee cases. Though the district court ruled in several cases
that a remedy, including actual release, was proper, the D.C. Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals has never approved such a release and has
struck down district court orders seeking to control the fate of de-
tainees.59
1. Kiyemba I and Kiyemba III-Petitions for Release into
the United States
Following the Boumediene decision and after a determination by
the Government that they were no longer "enemy combatants,"
seventeen Uighurs ° detained at Guantanamo Bay for over seven
years petitioned for the opportunity to challenge their detention as
unlawful and requested to be released into the United States.6'
57. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 702.
58. After the 2004 case Gherebi v. Bush, 374 F.3d 727 (9th Cir. 2004), in which a Guan-
tanamo habeas petition was transferred to the D.C. Circuit, all Guantanamo cases have
been filed there. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28, Kiyemba III, 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (No. 10-775).
59. Lyle Denniston, D.C. Circuit in Control on Detainees, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 4, 2011,
9:36 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/04/dc-circuit-in-control-on-detainees.
60. Uighurs are a Turkic Muslim minority group who fled their native China, where
they faced oppression, and moved to Afghanistan and lived in camps. Guantanamo Bay,
581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 34 (D.D.C. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Kiyemba 1, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir.
2009) vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (per curiam), reinstated as amended, Kiyemba III, 605
F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1631 (2011). The Govern-
ment alleged that these camps housed Taliban supporters. Guantanamo Bay, 581 F. Supp.
2d at 34.
61. Id. The detainees originally filed habeas petitions in July 2005. Though several
detainees were cleared for release over the next several years, all remained at Guantana-
mo. Id. at 35. All Uighur petitions were consolidated in 2008, and they were no longer
deemed to be "enemy combatants." Id.
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Because they were no longer classified as "enemy combatants," the
issue presented to the district court was "whether the Government
ha[d] the authority to 'wind up' the petitioners' detention" or if the
court could authorize the release of the Uighurs. 2
The district court decided that the Government's authority to
"wind-up" the detentions ceased when "(1) detention becomes ef-
fectively indefinite; (2) there is a reasonable certainty that the pe-
titioner will not return to the battlefield to fight against the Unit-
ed States; and (3) an alternative legal justification has not been
provided for continued detention. Once these elements are met,
further detention is unconstitutional." 3 Under this framework,
the court decided that the time for wind-up authority had ended,
and looked to the remedies the judiciary could utilize under its
habeas jurisdiction.64 The court concluded that based on separa-
tion of powers, the courts had authority to protect individual liber-
ty, especially when the Executive Branch brought the person into
the court's jurisdiction and then undermined the efforts of re-
lease.65 Noting that the Executive could not have the power to lim-
it the scope of habeas by merely assuring the court that it was us-
ing its best efforts to release the detainees, the court held that un-
der the system of checks and balances and the importance of sepa-
ration of powers to the protection of liberty, the motion for release
was granted.66
In the case renamed Kiyemba v. Obama on appeal, and com-
monly referred to as Kiyemba I, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, framing the issue as whether the courts had authority to
issue release into the United States.67 Because there was the po-
tential that the Petitioners would be harmed if returned to their
native China, the Government asserted that they had been under-
going extensive efforts to relocate the detainees in suitable third
countries.68 The court based its reversal on case law that held that
the power to exclude aliens from the country was an inherent Ex-
ecutive power, and not one with which the courts should inter-
62. Id. at 35.
63. Id. at 38.
64. Id. at 38-39.
65. Guantanamo Bay, 581 F. Supp. 2d at 42-43.
66. Id. at 42.
67. Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d 1022, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2009) vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (per
curiam), reinstated as amended, Kiyemba I1, 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1631 (2011).
68. Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1024.
182 Vol. 50
Guantanamo Detainees
fere.69 Though Petitioners claimed that release was within the
court's habeas power, the court of appeals noted that the Petition-
ers sought more than a "simple release"-they sought to be re-
leased into the United States, and habeas could not interfere with
the Executive's power to control the borders."
The Supreme Court granted the Petitioner's writ of certiorari in
which they argued that the courts had the authority to issue re-
lease of unlawfully detained prisoners under its habeas power and
to hold otherwise constituted a conflict with Boumediene."1 By the
time the case reached the High Court for determination on the
merits, all of the detainee-Petitioners received resettlement offers,
and only five had rejected these offers.72 Due to the possibility of a
factual difference based on this new information, the Supreme
Court remanded the case to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals."
The remanded case became known as Kiyemba III." The court
of appeals reinstated its former opinion from Kiyemba L75 The
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals noted that just prior to the Kiyemba
I decision, the government filed information under seal which in-
dicated that all seventeen Petitioners had received a resettlement
offer, and this influenced the court's conclusion that the Govern-
ment was engaging in diplomatic efforts to relocate the detainees
when it decided Kiyemba 1.76 Even if the Petitioners had a valid
reason to decline these offers, it did not change the underlying
notion that habeas afforded no remedy to be released into the
United States.77 Additionally, the court determined that the Peti-
tioners had no privilege to have the courts review the determina-
tions made by the Executive regarding the locations of resettle-
ment, as this was a foreign policy issue for the political branches
to handle.78
The five remaining petitioners filed a second petition for certi-
orari on December 8, 2010, asking the Supreme Court to decide
69. Id. at 1026 (citation omitted).
70. Id. at 1028.
71. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 30, Kiyemba 1, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (No.
08-1234).
72. Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235, 1235 (2010) (per curiam).
73. Kiyemba, 130 S. Ct. at 1235.
74. Kiyemba III, 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
1631 (2011).
75. Kiyemba III, 605 F.3d at 1047.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1048.
78. Id. (citing Kiyemba 11, 561 F.3d 509, 514-16 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied 130 S. Ct.
1880 (2010) (discussing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 701-02 (2008)).
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whether the courts had the power to release unlawfully detained
aliens under its habeas jurisdiction.7 9
2. Kiyemba H and Petitions Requesting Notice of Transfer
Prior to Release
While the Kiyemba I and Kiyemba III litigation was occurring, a
separate Uighur petition was moving through the D.C. Circuit.
Nine Uighurs petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas, and
asked the court to require the government to provide 30 days' ad-
vance notice of any transfer from Guantanamo based on fear of
torture, and the district court granted the petition.80 The cases
were consolidated on appeal and renamed Kiyemba v. Obama,
which is referred to as Kiyemba H. The Kiyemba H case has been
the source of much debate over both the proper allocation of power
in the tripartite system and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals' use
of Supreme Court precedent in detainee cases. The D.C. Court of
Appeals analogized the Uighurs' claims in the Kiyemba H case to
the 2008 Supreme Court decision Munaf v. Geren, which held that
habeas corpus did not prevent the transfer of an American citizen
in captivity in Iraq to face prosecution in a sovereign state."
The court of appeals analyzed the Uughurs' claims by compar-
ing them to the Munaf petitioners. First, the court found that the
Uighurs and the petitioners in Munaf sought an order of the dis-
trict court to enjoin their transfer based on fear of torture in the
82 irecipient country. As in Munaf, the court decided that if the
United States Government had asserted that it was against its
policy to transfer detainees to a location where they may face tor-
ture, the Judiciary could not question that determination.83 In
reaching that conclusion, the Kiyemba H court cited to the Munaf
language that the Judiciary should not "second-guess" the Execu-
tive in matters of foreign policy.84
79. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kiyemba III, supra note 58, at i.
80. Kiyemba II, 561 F.3d at 511.
81. Id. at 514 (referring to Munaf, 553 U.S. 674).
82. Id. at 514.
83. Id. (citation omitted).
84. Id. (citations omitted). The Petitioners attempted to distinguish Munaf by noting
that those petitioners did not bring a claim under the Convention Against Torture as im-
plemented in by the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act. Id. (citing Munaf, 553
U.S. at 703 n.6). The Court rejected that distinction, and noted that judicial review was
limited under that statute to challenge final orders of removal, and the Uighurs were not
challenging such orders. Id. at 514-15.
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Just as the court rejected the fear of torture argument, the Peti-
tioners' claims that transfer should be enjoined to prevent contin-
ued detention or prosecution in the recipient country was also de-
nied based on Munaf.8" As Munaf reasoned, detainees could not
use habeas as a means to hide from prosecution in a sovereign
country, and any judicial investigation into a recipient country's
laws and procedures would violate international comity and the
Executive Branch's role as the sole voice on foreign policy.8" Addi-
tionally, because the 30 days' notice requirements were seen as an
attempt by the courts to enjoin the transfer of a detainee, they,
too, were impermissible remedies. 7
Judge Griffith, concurring and dissenting in part, opined that
Munaf did not require total deference to the political branches in
detainee matters, that privileges of detainees outlined in Boume-
diene required advance notice of any transfer from Guantanamo,
and the opportunity to challenge the Government's determination
that transfer to the recipient country would not result in torture
or additional detainment.88 The Judge distinguished Munaf from
the present situation because in the former, the petitioners knew
they were going to be transferred to Iraqi custody and had an op-
portunity to bring habeas petitions to challenge that transfer.8 In
closing, Judge Griffith believed that "[t]he constitutional habeas
protections extended to these petitioners by Boumediene [would]
be greatly diminished, if not eliminated, without an opportunity to
challenge the government's assurances that their transfers will
not result in continued detention on behalf of the United States.""
Following this reversal, the Petitioners filed a motion for re-
hearing and suggested a rehearing en banc, as well as a stay of
the mandate of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.8 ' Both of these
motions were denied, and the Petitioners filed a writ for a petition
of certiorari on November 10, 2009.9' The Supreme Court denied
the writ on March 22, 2010.93
85. Kiyemba H, 561 F.3d at 515.
86. Id. at 515 (quoting Munaf, 553 U.S. at, 700-0 1).
87. Id. at 515-16.
88. Id. at 523 (Griffih, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
89. Id. at 526.
90. Kiyemba H, 561 F.3d at 526
91. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, Kiyemba 11, 561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (No.
09-581).
92. Id.
93. Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1880 (2010).
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D. Supreme Court Denies Certiorari in 2010 Term in Guantana-
mo Detainee Cases
Following the extensive litigation in the District of Columbia
Circuit regarding issues of Guantanamo detainees, the Supreme
Court's 2010 Term was presented with eight petitions for certiora-
ri asking to address various issues.94 Three of these petitions in-
volved separation of powers issues and the courts' ability to effec-
tuate release, transfer and notice in habeas proceedings. Kiyemba
III was presented before the 2010 Term, raising for a second time
the issue of whether the courts could issue the release of a peti-
tioner. Two other petitions, Mohammed v. Obama and Khadr v.
Obama, asked the Supreme Court to reconsider the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals' use of the Munaf precedent in Kiyemba II.
Petitioners in Kiyemba III were the remaining five Uighurs who
had not accepted the Government's relocation offers and remained
at Guantanamo.95 They continued to seek a judicial order that
would permit them to be released into the United States, and ar-
gued that the D.C. Circuit had impermissibly limited the power of
the judiciary by making it an advisor to the Executive with no
power to order release under its habeas power.96 Due to several
facts including the availability of several offers for the petitioners
to take, the lack of a meritorious argument as to the inappro-
priateness of the proposed offers, and the Government's continued
efforts to find adequate resettlement, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari on April 18, 2011. 9'
Petitioners Mohammed and Khadr presented the same issue to
the Court: whether Munaf required and Boumediene, the Suspen-
sion Clause, and Due Process permitted the district courts in ha-
beas cases to accept the government's assurances that the peti-
tioner was unlikely to be tortured if transferred to a recipient
country which would divest the court from fashioning a remedy
and prevent the petitioner from challenging that determination.98
94. Lyle Denniston, Primer: The New Detainee Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 7, 2010, 7:47
PM), http://www.scotusblog.con/2010/12lprimer-the-new-detainee-cases.
95. Kiyemba, 130 S. Ct. at 1235.
96. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kiyemba III, supra note 58, at 2-3.
97. Kiyemba, 131 S. Ct. at 1631.
98. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Mohammed v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 2901 (2011)




Petitioner Mohammed was an Algerian citizen who was cap-
tured in Pakistan in 2002 and sent to Guantanamo."5 He initially
filed a petition for habeas corpus in 2005, and while the petition
was pending, Mohammed was set to be transferred from Guanta-
namo. 00  In November 2009, the district court granted Mo-
hammed's petition for habeas corpus and ordered the Government
to ". . . take all necessary and appropriate steps to facilitate [his]
release forthwith."1 ' Upon the Government's appeal, the motion
was suspended.'2
While Mohammed's petition was being litigated, the district
court also issued 30-day advance notice orders in all habeas cases
after the Boumediene decision in 2008.'03 The validity of these or-
ders was to be discussed for the first time in Kiyemba I.' Prior
to the final decision in Kiyemba II, the district court also enjoined
the Government from transferring Mohammed to Algeria, and the
Government's appeal was deferred until the Kiyemba case was
decided. ' 5 After Kiyemba 11 suggested that the lower courts
should refrain from "second-guessing" the Executive Branch's con-
clusions about the possibility of torture in countries where detai-
nees may be transferred, the Government filed a motion to dis-
solve the preliminary injunction preventing Mohammed's trans-
fer."0 This motion was granted on the basis of the recent Kiyemba
II decision.0 7
A motion for reconsideration filed by Mohammed was denied,
and he subsequently filed an emergency petition for a preliminary
injunction against transfer based on his fear of torture if returned
to Algeria."°' The district court entered an administrative stay
pending the final decision on the preliminary injunction, and a
99. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mohammed, supra note 98, at 1-2.
100. Id. at 2.
101. Mohammed v. Obama, 689 F. Supp. 2d 38, 69 (D.D.C. 2009).
102. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mohammed, supra note 98, at 2. Because the peti-
tion was originally filed under seal, portions of the petition have been redacted in the re-
leased version.
103. Id. at 3.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 3-4.
106. Id. at 5.
107. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mohammed, supra note 98, at 5 (citation omitted).
108. Id. at 5-6.
Winter 2012
Duquesne Law Review
hearing was held after which the district court granted the injunc-
tion by distinguishing the Munaf and Kiyemba II cases.109
The court of appeals held that the district court erred in grant-
ing the injunction based on its interpretation of Munaf in Kiyemba
11.110 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals denied Mohammed's re-
quest for stay pending a petition for certiorari to the Supreme
Court, and he then petitioned the Supreme Court to order such a
stay."' On July 16, 2010, the Supreme Court denied the petition,
but three dissenting Justices sparked new hope for the Guanta-
namo petitioners: Justice Ginsberg, Justice Breyer and Justice
Sotomayor dissented from the denial of the stay, noting that they
"would grant the stay to afford the Court time to consider, in the
ordinary course, important questions raised in this case and not
resolved in Munaf v. Geren [.]H
2
As several Justices seemed to be questioning the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals' use of the Munaf case and the impact of the
court of appeals' interpretation of that decision on the entire scope
of detainee litigation, a petition for writ of certiorari was filed in
the Mohammed case."' Before the Supreme Court could address
the case, however, the petition became moot as Mohammed was
transferred to Algeria on January 5, 2011."1
The Khadr petition arose from the 2008 notice orders issued by
the district court which were vacated by the court of appeals based
on Kiyemba II's position that the courts could not enjoin the trans-
fer of a detainee."' Because the issue in Khadr was identical to
the Mohammed petition regarding the power of the courts to en-
join transfer by requiring notice for the petitioner to have the op-
portunity to present evidence to counter the Government's assur-
ances, the petition incorporated the arguments outlined in Mo-
hammed.11
Though the Supreme Court could not grant certiorari in Mo-
hammed, the Court chose not to address the issue in Khadr as
109. Id. at 6-7. The district court believed that Munaf was different because it involved
criminal conduct, rather than an individual who had a right to freedom, and that Munaf
did not involve fear of torture at the hands of non-governmental entities. Id. at 7.
110. Id. at 10 (citing Kiyemba 11, 561 F.3d 509, 516 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 1880 (2010); Munafv. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008)).
111. Id. at 10-11.
112. Mohammed v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 32 (2010).
113. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mohammed, supra note 98.
114. Final Status Report and Mot. to Dismiss Appeals as Moot at 2, Mohammed v. Ob-
ama (Nos. 10-5034 & 10-5045).
115. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Khadr, supra note 98, at 2.
116. Id. at 6.
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certiorari was denied on May 23, 2011.117 Out of the eight Guan-
tanamo petitions filed in the 2010 Term, the Supreme Court de-
nied Kiyemba III, Khadr and five others, and the Mohammed peti-
tion was rendered moot.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Arguments for a Remedy
By urging deference to the Executive Branch, the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals has scolded the district courts that have second-
guessed the political branches' determinations about release and
suitable transfers. Those in favor of judicial power have argued
that the denial of the right to review the Executive's decisions is
allowing too much deference to that branch and severely limiting
the remedies that courts have had the power to issue in the past.
Though the petitioners have made several arguments for relief,
the main arguments for judicial power stem from the idea that the
court of appeals has been improperly applying Supreme Court
precedent. Petitioners have argued that the D.C. Court of Appeals
expanded the scope of Munaf too broadly as the Supreme Court
noted that the decision was limited to the facts of that case.18 In
Munaf, the Court was primarily concerned about allowing the Ira-
qi government to have the power to punish people who had com-
mitted crimes in that territory when fashioning its holding, and
the petitioners in that case had the opportunity of notice because
they were told about their transfer and were able to petition the
court to try and prevent it." 9 Petitioners have argued that those
facts are entirely different than cases such as Mohammed and
Khadr were there was concern of torture in foreign nations but no
need to allow those nations to have the ability to prosecute the
detainees for crimes, there was potential for torture at the hands
of non-government entities, and no notice of transfer was permit-
ted.
20
117. Khadr v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 2900 (2011). Justice Breyer and Justice Sotomayor
would have granted the petition. Id.
118. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mohammed, supra note 98, at 12-14.
119. Id. at 14-15.
120. Id. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Khadr, supra note 98, at 6 (incorporating
Mohammed arguments). See also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, Abdah v. Obama,
630 F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (No. 11-421).
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Additionally, Petitioners have argued that the use of Munaf has
impermissibly limited Boumediene by preventing courts from fa-
shioning equitable relief for habeas petitions.'2 ' There has been
concern that the ability to use the writ of habeas will be essential-
ly eliminated if there is no chance for a petitioner to challenge the
Executive Branch's determinations regarding safe transfers. The
Boumediene Court spent considerable time discussing the history
of the writ 22 and noted that the tribunals implemented in that
case to determine enemy combatant status were not a sufficient
replacement for the writ of habeas because they lacked, in part,
the authority to issue an order of release.' 23 Here, the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals has effectively prevented the other courts from
determining if there is a right not to be transferred, which has
been argued to be an inadequate statement of the right of ha-
beas.2 Similarly, it has been argued that by accepting the Execu-
tive Branch's assurances of its efforts to release the detainees, the
courts are not properly using the power of habeas corpus that has
been granted to them by the Constitution.'2 ' By refusing to ques-
tion these assertions, the courts would be unable to offer a remedy
to the petitioners who have the privilege of habeas corpus.'
The Petitioners also argued a due process right to challenge
transfers as the detainees have a right to a meaningful hearing to
at least have the opportunity to challenge the Government's con-
clusions regarding safety.'27 By refusing to second-guess the Ex-
ecutive, the judiciary may be losing an important check on the
former's power because there is no guarantee that the Executive is
ensuring safety or making the best effort to protect the unlawfully
kept detainees. Without allowing courts to have the power to en-
join a transfer in order to examine these concerns, there is the po-
tential that the detainee could be harmed at the hands of foreign
terrorists.
Without the ability to challenge the Executive Branch through
the judicial tool of habeas corpus, there has been genuine concern
that the courts are losing too much power and that their authority
121. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mohammed, supra note 98, at 17.
122. Boumnediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739-47 (2008).
123. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 792.
124. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mohammed, supra note 98, at 18.
125. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kiyemba I, supra note 71, at 16-17.
126. Id. at 17
127. Id. at 31-33.
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is being improperly limited, as they are not utilizing their consti-
tutional power properly.
B. Arguments for Deference
Based on Kiyemba IIs use of Munaf, the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals has determined that the courts cannot prevent a govern-
ment transfer from Guantanamo to another country once the gov-
ernment has determined that the prisoner will not be subject to
torture in that country.' The court has also urged deference to
the political branches' assertions that they are working to release
prisoners in a timely manner.29 The court has seemed to follow an
"if you say so" policy to the declarations of the Executive Branch in
making decisions that impact the rights of the Guantanamo de-
tainees.
The Government has argued that there is a necessity to defe-
rence because of the sensitive nature of the issues in these cases.
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Kiyemba H noted that requir-
ing pre-transfer notice would interfere with the Executive
Branch's ability to engage in negotiations with foreign nations for
the transfer of detainees."0 The Executive Branch has the power
to conduct the foreign affairs of the United States, and there is
significant time and effort that goes into establishing relation-
ships with foreign states in our nation's diplomatic endeavors.'
It has been the established government policy to prevent the
transfer of a detainee when there is a possibility of facing torture,
and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has not allowed interference
with those declarations. If the government has investigated the
recipient nations in the transfer cases and has come to a conclu-
sion that the transfer will be safe, allowing judicial interference
may anger the recipient nations with accusations of human rights
violations. Furthermore, such judicial determinations could un-
dermine the Executive Branch's efforts of gaining the recipient
nation's trust in order to facilitate an exchange of important in-
formation about the inner-workings of these governments. Fur-
thermore, it has not traditionally been the realm of the courts to
128. Kiyemba II, 561 F.3d 509, 516 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1880 (2010).
129. Kiyemba IIl, 605 F.3d 1048 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
1631 (2011).
130. Kiyemba H, 561 F.3d at 514.
131. Brief for Respondents in Opposition at 16-17, Kiyemba H, 561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (No. 09-581).
132. Kiyemba 1I, 561 F.3d at 514.
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investigate foreign diplomacy. By allowing judicial interference,
the veil of confidentiality in the diplomatic negotiations could be
in peril.
133
The Government has argued that the D.C. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals correctly applied Munaf to the issue of whether a court can
prevent the transfer of a detainee to a foreign nation upon release
from confinement.134 Citing as proof that the Kiyemba II was
proper, there have been numerous cases that have reaffirmed it,
and the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in that case.'
The Government has also rejected attempts to distinguish the
Munaf case. The Government disclaimed the factual distinctions,
and noted that the main similarity was the fact that the Govern-
ment in both instances provided assurances that the detainees
would not be transferred to countries where torture was likely.1
3
6
The Government also asserted that the argument that Munaf was
limited to its facts should not be read so narrowly, as it rationale
was not as limited. 137 Regardless of the factual distinctions, the
petitioners still sought the same remedy-an injunction to prevent
transfer based on torture-that should be governed under the au-
thority of the Executive.
1 38
Due process arguments have also been foreclosed by Munaf in
the view of the Government because the political branches have
the power to decide whether a foreign nation's policies are just,
thus giving the judiciary no place in assessing whether transfers
should be avoided on the basis of a potential loss of constitutional
rights.9  The courts are not an avenue to challenge the Executive
Branch's conclusions of which foreign nations would potentially
torture transferred detainees on the basis of due process.
Lastly, the Government has contended that the Kiyemba II de-
cision does not undermine or limit the Supreme Court's holding in
Boumediene because that case and Munaf were decided on the
same day by the Supreme Court and Munaf directly stated that
habeas relief is unavailable in some situations, namely when the
133. Brief for Respondents in Opposition, Kiyemba H, supra note 131, at 20-21.
134. Brief for Respondents in Opposition at 5-6 Khadr v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 2900 (2011)
(No. 10-751).
135. Id. at 5.
136. Brief for Respondents in Opposition, Kiyemba II, supra note 131, at 21-22.
137. Id. at 23.
138. Id.
139. Brief for Respondents in Opposition, Khadr, supra note 134, at 10.
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government has decided that torture is unlikely to result after
transfer.4 '
In the separation of powers struggle, those in favor of deference
have viewed the Executive Branch as a trustworthy and diligent
diplomat, investigating and negotiating in order to resettlement
for Guantanamo detainees."' Such foreign policy issues are argu-
ably properly before the Executive Branch and are not a matter of
concern for the judiciary because the courts are not engaged in
diplomatic relations. While the time of detainment may be ex-
tended as a result of these investigations, the argument is that the
Government is merely doing the job which it has power to do. The
major concern is that the Executive Branch is engaging in delicate
diplomacy and district court judges who are not involved in those
negotiations and do not know the entirety of the situation would
have the ability to sever those diplomatic lines and in the long
run, harm detainees' chances of safe transfer due to foreign na-
tion's anger or refusal to cooperate if they were able to second-
guess the Executive.
C. The Need for Supreme Guidance
In light of the compelling arguments on both sides, several im-
portant issues have ambiguous answer, and the Supreme Court
has, thus far, not chosen to shine light on the situation. Following
the 2010 October Term and the Supreme Court's denial of all
Guantanamo detainee petitions, the High Court has sent a mes-
sage that it does not want to review the D.C. Circuit's interpreta-
tion of the procedural and substantive issues which that Circuit
has implemented.
The Supreme Court has not ruled on any cases relating to
Guantanamo detainees since its 2008 decision in Boumediene v.
Bush. While the Court settled the issue of whether detainees had
the privilege of habeas corpus in that case, the Court left the intri-
cacies of the writ and its scope for the lower courts to define.
Though leaving this authority in the hands of the lower courts
may have been a been appropriate at the time Boumediene was
decided, the number of habeas petitions and the subsequent peti-
tions for certiorari to the Supreme Court indicate that there are
important issues that must be clarified, and the Supreme Court
140. Id.




should grant certiorari to be the final voice on these issues for sev-
eral reasons.
First, the stakes in these habeas petitions are high. The detai-
nees at Guantanamo have already been assured the right to peti-
tion the courts for habeas corpus to challenge their detention as
unlawful. The scope of the courts' authority to provide a remedy is
a critical for those individuals on a personal level as well as for the
nation as whole. This country was created with a tripartite sys-
tem and checks and balances for a reason: the Founding Fathers
implemented a governmental structure that would serve to limit
the three individual branches in order to protect individual liber-
ty.142 The writ of habeas corpus has an extensive history and is
considered to play an integral role in the protection of individual
liberty.14 Habeas corpus is the Judiciary's tool to check the power
of the Executive, and has traditionally allowed courts to provide a
remedy to reign in the unbridled power of the Executive. The
Court in Boumediene asserted that habeas gave the prisoner a
meaningful opportunity to challenge his confinement as unlawful,
and "the habeas court must have the power to order conditional
release of an individual unlawfully detained - though release need
not be the exclusive remedy and is not the appropriate one in
every case in which the writ is granted.""'
While the importance of the writ for the preservation of the in-
dividual liberty and as a check on Executive power is one aspect of
the tripartite system, the Executive's interest in maintaining a
unified voice in the realm of foreign policy is another key concern.
By allowing the courts to order release of a detainee or to order
advance notice of transfer so that the petitioner may present evi-
dence that he would be harmed in a recipient country, the Judi-
ciary would be forced to make determinations about foreign affairs
that its judges may not be competent to make. In a time of chaos
and intricate foreign relations, the sensitivity and difficulty of
forging meaningful diplomatic relations with other nations at this
time in history is a key concern of the Executive, and properly
within that Branch's authority under the Constitution. Permit-
ting the Judiciary to make determinations from the bench about
the appropriateness of human rights or other similar determina-
tions in a judicial proceeding could very well damage the diplo-
142. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008).
143. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 742.
144. Id. at 779.
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matic relations that the Executive is attempting to form with reci-
pient nations.
This separation of powers dilemma facing the High Court has
no easy solution, but the critical role that the proper allocation of
authority plays in the separation of powers system and the lack of
substantive guidance on Guantanamo issues since Boumediene in
2008 demands attention from the Supreme Court. Additionally,
because the Guantanamo cases have been litigated in the D.C.
Circuit, no other appellate courts have had the opportunity to re-
view these issues.'45 Without the opportunity for an opposing view
in another judicial circuit and with no final determination by the
Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has been free to
shape the law of Guantanamo habeas cases as it wishes. Adding
to the concern of the lack of a "check" on the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals is the fact that the trend within the Circuit itself has been
inconsistent as the district courts have assumed a greater role for
the judiciary, only to be chastised on appeal for failure to defer to
the political branches in these cases.
With the D.C. Circuit serving as the sole authority on the scope
of the courts' habeas power in Guantanamo cases, petitioners'
claims that this court has been improperly applying Supreme
Court precedent is another concern that the High Court should
address. In both release and transfer cases, the petitioners have
argued that while Boumediene assures the privilege of habeas cor-
pus, the Kiyemba cases have foreclosed the courts from fashioning
a remedy in contradiction to Boumediene.146 Instead, the D. C.
Circuit Court of Appeals has refused to interfere, based on the
Munaf proposition that the determinations of the Executive
should not be second-guessed, and has accepted the assurances of
the Executive Branch that they are working secure release or that
they will not send detainees to countries where it is more likely
than not that they will face torture.
Raising suspicions that the use of Munaf in the Guantanamo
habeas cases was perhaps improper, three Supreme Court Justic-
es questioned the role of that decision and the questions it raised.
Petitioners have alleged that the circumstances of that case are
markedly different than the facts in the Guantanamo cases, and
that Munaf should not be read to bar detainees in habeas petitions
145. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kiyemba III, supra note 58, at 28.
146. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779.
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the opportunity to challenge their transfer or the court to enjoin
such a transfer.
The nature of these Guantanamo issues presents a complex sit-
uation that makes the separation of powers issue more difficult. If
the courts do traditionally have the power to require notice or or-
der release under its habeas authority, the manner in which that
remedy would require inquiry into the Executive Branch's policy
decisions may cross the line into a political question. Because of
the nature of diplomacy and foreign affairs in contemporary socie-
ty, the thought may be that it is easier to reduce the rights of the
individual in order to provide for the national security of the coun-
try as a whole.
IV. CONCLUSION
There are valid arguments on both sides in this issue and the
nature of the cases and the times in which we live complicate the
situation. The Supreme Court is in a difficult situation-if the
Court grants certiorari to review the D.C. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals' jurisprudence of the Guantanamo cases, it must settle an
issue of vast importance. Separation of powers and the roles of
the Executive and Judiciary in the context of Guantanamo litiga-
tion impact the individual liberty of the petitioners and the sensi-
tive nature of foreign affairs and the war on terrorism. Because of
significance of these issues, the D.C. Circuit should not be the sole
voice addressing them. It should be the responsibility of the na-
tion's Highest Court to settle the debate and determine the appro-
priate balance of power. Without this supreme guidance, the peti-
tioners will continue to present the same issues and questions to
the courts, and these cases will continue to be litigated according
to the trend that has dominated the D.C. Circuit over the past
several years.
With a new Supreme Court Term beginning and new Guanta-
namo cases bearing old issues appearing before the Court again,
the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to review the delicate
balance between the power of the courts and the authority of the
political branches. The Court left the scope of habeas power unde-
fined after Boumediene and has refused to substantively address
the issues created in its aftermath. Since that decision, the D.C.
Circuit has given great deference to the Executive Branch. With-
out any supreme guidance, the D.C. Circuit has been free to fa-
shion the law as it sees fit with no further checks and balances on
that interpretation as this Circuit is the sole decision-maker re-
Vol. 50196
Guantanamo Detainees
garding these habeas petitions. If the current system stays in
place, appeals and petitions regarding the same issues for Guan-
tanamo detainees will continue to cycle through the D.C. Circuit.
With so many petitions to the High Court on the same subject, it
seems only logical that the Supreme Court should finish what it
started nearly six years ago and decide whether the courts have a
role to play in the release and transfer of detainees. More Guan-
tanamo petitions for certiorari have been filed in the 2011 Term,
and one has raised a familiar issue yet again: whether the Guan-
tanamo detainees have the right to challenge transfer to a reci-
pient nation on fear of torture.
The Founding Fathers envisioned a system of checks and bal-
ances in order to protect the People from oppression and to pre-
vent any one person or entity from hoarding too much power. The
struggle for power between the branches of our government is
something that will never fade away entirely, and there are times
when it is proper for one branch to defer to the judgment of anoth-
er, but when an issue arises that has raised so many questions
and has been the foundation for numerous appeals and petitions
to the Supreme Court for clarification, the People deserve at least
some guidance on such an unsettled area of the law. As of now,
the D.C. Circuit has been trustworthy of the Executive Branch,
and, while in the end, such deference in this area may be appro-
priate, the very nature of habeas corpus is a strong tool in the
hands of the judiciary which should be considered by the Supreme
Court. The Court should analyze whether allowing deference
strips the Judiciary of the important check of habeas corpus be-
cause granting the right of habeas corpus to prisoners without
giving the courts the subsequent power to remedy the problem has
the potential of making this important right just a phrase with no
underlying force.
Jennifer L. Milko
147. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Abdah, supra note 120, at i.
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